By Patrick Chamorel, George Washington University

Academic Citation: Patrick Chamorel, “The Comparative Leadership Styles of French and American Presidents,” Kravis Leadership Institute Leadership Review, Summer 2003.

About the Author: Patrick Chamorel teaches European Politics at the George Washington University. In 2002-3, he was a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and in the spring semester of 2002, Crown visiting professor of political science at CMC. He has been a visiting scholar at the Institute of Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley and a Congressional Fellow. From 1982 to 1995, he was a senior advisor in the French Ministry of Industry and then the policy planning office of the Prime Minister. He has written extensively on Comparative US and European politics and recently has focused on transatlantic relations.

In his 2000 book The Presidential Difference, Fred Greenstein, a leading scholar of political psychology and American presidents, explores the leadership qualities and shortcomings of the twelve U.S. presidents from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Greenstein analyzes their backgrounds, political styles and conduct of the presidency. He identifies six dimensions of presidential job performance, focusing on “the attributes that shaped their leadership rather than the merits of their policies.” They are: proficiency as a public communicator, organizational capacity, political skill, vision of public policy, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence.

Greenstein justifies his inquiry into presidential leadership styles by pointing out that the US government is “one in which the matter of who occupies the nation’s highest office can have profound repercussions.” This is due, he says, to the emergence of the modern presidency since FDR, which tilted the balance of power away from the Congress and towards the White House, as well as presidential constitutional powers, the president’s “ability to command public attention and shape the national policy agenda,” and his ascent in “the global arena, where his actions as commander in chief can determine the fate of the human race.”

To be sure, no other political leader in the world enjoys the international reach and visibility of the American president. Yet, Greenstein also underscores the unique degree to which the personality of American presidents permeates the whole political system: “If some higher power had set out to design a democracy in which the individual on top mattered, the result might well resemble the American political system.” He adds that “this is not everywhere the case. In Great Britain, with its tradition of collective leadership, the rare Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair is far outnumbered by the many Stanley Baldwins, Harold Wilsons and John Majors, whose personal impact on government actions is at best limited.”

But is the U.S. unique among large democracies for the impact of personal leadership style on the whole political system? If Greenstein discards Britain, despite her strong prime minister form of parliamentary regime, has he considered presidential or semi-presidential systems that could prove better comparisons with the U.S.? Russia, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have strong presidents who are popularly elected but one can argue that these countries are not yet strong and stable democracies. Finland, Iceland, Portugal, Ireland and Austria also have popularly elected presidents but these have to share power with prime ministers and they are countries of modest size.

This paper posits that the French presidency under the 5^th Republic established by Charles de Gaulle in 1958, comes closest to the American presidency regarding the powers vested in the president as well as the influence of presidential leadership style on the whole political system. This article will apply Greenstein’s approach to French presidents and attempt a few comparisons between the leadership styles of French and American presidents.

Comparing the French and American presidency

French presidents lack the international role of their American counterparts. However, it is the strong presidency that allows France to keep playing an important role in international affairs. French presidents derive their powers from the constitution as well as constitutional practice, and these powers match or exceed those of American presidents (Chamorel in Dahl, 1994). Both presidents are popularly elected in elections that are the main focus of political life. Neither can be overthrown by parliament. The French president can dissolve parliament, call a referendum and be granted emergency powers. He is the commander-in-chief, chairs the Council of Ministers and appoints the top civil servants and three out of nine members of the Constitutional Council without parliamentary consent.

Some skeptics could point to the obvious fact that, unlike his US counterpart, the French president must share executive power with a prime minister. But this would not take into account the reality that the executive power that needs to be shared is much stronger and the legislative branch much weaker in France than in the US: in the latter, the president’s influence is counterbalanced by a strong Congress and independent regulatory agencies, federalism, an aggressive press and powerful interest groups.

An equally important point is that much of the French president’s power derives precisely from his prerogative to appoint a prime minister, who stands as his clear second and whom he can dismiss. Actually, one way the prime minister strengthens rather than weakens the president is the expectation that he or she will protect the president from the political fallout of unpopular decisions.

This predominance of the president over the prime minister is altered only in periods during which the president must govern with a parliamentary majority opposed to his own camp (we shall term this cohabitation). He then has to appoint an opposition leader as prime minister, whose role in day-to-day management of the government and domestic policies supersedes that of the president. However, the president never relinquishes his constitutional prerogatives or his preponderance in foreign affairs and defense.

The different institutional contexts on each side of the Atlantic call for somewhat different skills and priorities from the presidents: in the U.S., the focus is on Congress, while in France it is on holding the governing coalition of parties together or, in periods of cohabitation, on neutralizing the prime minister. But both are equally exposed to the scrutiny of the media.

The expectations of the people also differ: the French will only elect an experienced political leader who has had long-term national visibility, whereas Americans can be tempted by novelty and are receptive to the messages of Washington outsiders. The French expect intellectual distinction and competence from their presidents and are reluctant to take into account their leaders’ private lives. Americans focus more on character and morality. The French want their president to be a republican monarch whereas Americans seek a person who can associate with the ordinary citizen. In both cases, the public expects the president to embody the country’s positive image overseas.

In both political systems, the leadership style of the president has had a huge impact. In France, General de Gaulle shaped the 1958 constitution and its practice. He influenced public expectations of the presidency as well as his successors’ leadership styles. The long seven-year presidential term, reduced to five years starting with Jacques Chirac’s current second term, has been an additional factor in allowing the personal style of a president to permeate the whole regime.

Following Greenstein’s example (2000), profiles of each French president and presidency are offered (Conte, 1985). The French sample is smaller (five presidents instead of twelve) and doesn’t go as far back in time as Greenstein’s (starting in 1958 with de Gaulle instead of 1932 with FDR). It includes Charles de Gaulle (1958-69), Georges Pompidou (1969-74), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974-81), François Mitterrand (1981-95) and Jacques Chirac (1995- ). It doesn’t include Alain Poher, the president of the Senate who assumed the interim presidency after de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969 and again after Pompidou’s death in office in 1974. We shall assess the leadership of French presidents using Greenstein’s six categories, assuming relevance cross culturally. Applying the same categories will encourage comparisons between American and French presidents.

Charles de Gaulle

Charles de Gaulle was born in 1890 in Lille, near the Belgian border, into a family of upper-middle class catholic intellectuals with monarchic leanings. He attended the French equivalent of West Point and, as an officer, revealed unusual leadership abilities. He wrote several visionary books recommending major reforms in the military, such as the establishment of a professional army and new approaches to warfare combining tanks and aircraft. A junior cabinet minister when WWII broke out, he dared defying the armistice signed by his former boss, WWI hero Marchal Pétain, and called for continuing the fight, declaring in a prescient way that Germany could be defeated and would eventually lose the war. Thanks to his leadership of the French resistance against the Germans, he was able to head a provisional government after the liberation of the country in 1944. He resigned in January 1946 after the French electorate rejected his proposal for a new constitution.

In 1958, the leaders of the 4^th Republic turned to the war hero to help solve the Algerian crisis. Instead of keeping Algeria French, he understood the inevitability of decolonization and granted independence in 1962. His actions were inspired by a clear and strong vision. For example, his vision of a constitution providing for a strong and popularly elected president – approved by referendum in 1958 and 1962 -- had developed during the war and was laid out in a famous 1946 speech. His foreign policy was inspired by grandeur and independence: he created a nuclear force, pulled France out of NATO, opposed the Vietnam war, worked with chancellor Adenauer to reconcile France and Germany, blocked Britain’s entry into the Common Market and opposed a supranational Europe.

De Gaulle had felt deeply humiliated by the defeat of June 1940 and was obsessed with French renaissance and unity, both of which he meant to embody. He never concealed his contempt for political parties, parliament, the selfish bourgeoisie and those who indulged in divisions and lacked ambition for France. He was a man of order but a rebel as well: against the military doctrines that prevailed before the war, against Pétain and the Vichy regime, and against the 4^th Republic’s constitution and political class.

De Gaulle was constantly frustrated by being unable to unite all the French behind him. For example, he suffered the humiliation of failing to be reelected in the first round of the 1965 presidential elections. His isolation at the top and probably his age prevented him from perceiving the undercurrents of social change, and he didn’t anticipate the youth movement of 1968 that fatally shook his regime. For that youth, he embodied a conservative, remote and repressive form of leadership. Weakened by the students’ revolt of May 1968, he lost his self-assurance, exposed himself to a referendum defeat in 1969 and left power. He died one year later.

Georges Pompidou

Georges Pompidou was born in 1911, the son of primary school teachers in remote rural central France. Most of his relatives were peasants or small shopkeepers. A bright student, he studied letters at the elite Ecole Normale Supérieure. He was the only one of the five presidents of the 5^th Republic who lacked a burning political ambition and who could happily have pursued a different career. He never planned his political career and ended up in politics haphazardly when de Gaulle asked him to leave the Rothschild Bank in 1962 to become Prime Minister. His calm demeanor and ability to reassure others helped him deal with de Gaulle, manage political crises such as in May 1968, and appease an electorate subjected to de Gaulle’s towering personality and dramatic style. Despite his loyalty to de Gaulle, the two fell out during the May 1968 student revolt. De Gaulle thought Pompidou had played too prominent, independent -- and successful -- a role in that crisis and replaced him with Maurice Couve de Murville.

Pompidou was easily elected to succeed de Gaulle in 1969 despite his relative lack of charisma and campaigning skills. He was aware he could not emulate de Gaulle’s style and continued to cast himself as a more modest, reassuring and accessible figure. Unlike the regal General, he projected the image of the ordinary Frenchman, the embodiment of peasant common sense. He was more pragmatic than ideological, but by temperament and philosophy, he was an enlightened conservative.

Pompidou had barely had time to emerge from de Gaulle’s shadow when he himself was overshadowed by his prime minister, the youthful and dynamic Jacques Chaban-Delmas. Chaban’s reformist agenda clashed with Pompidou’s instinctive conservatism. In 1972, Pompidou replaced Chaban with the more docile and less ambitious Pierre Messmer. His presidency drifted in the last two years due to illness, and he died in office on April 2, 1974.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was born in 1926 in Germany into a wealthy, austere and demanding family of higher level civil servants and politicians. After brilliant studies at Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole Nationale d’Administration, he joined the top ranks of the Ministry of Finance. In 1956, at age 30, he was elected deputy in the family’s political stronghold of central France. His unusual competence and self-assurance impressed de Gaulle who appointed him junior minister in 1958 and minister of finance in 1962.

Having campaigned for de Gaulle in the 1965 presidential elections, he was deeply disappointed when de Gaulle and Pompidou decided to dismiss him. He and his centrist party distanced themselves further from the General and bargained for a bigger voice in the governing coalition. In 1967, an increasingly confident Giscard denounced de Gaulle’s “solitary exercise of power” and in 1969, called for a “no” vote in the referendum that led to de Gaulle’s resignation. He overcame a difficult relationship with Pompidou to support his candidacy and was rewarded with another stint as Finance Minister.

After brilliantly distancing Chaban in the first round of the 1974 presidential election, Giscard narrowly defeated Mitterrand in the run-off and appointed Chirac prime minister. Giscard’s ambitious and somewhat idealistic goal was to usher in a less divisive and passionate era of French politics by transcending the most bitter ideological oppositions. He tried to create a lasting majority force at the center of French politics, rejecting only the most conservative Gaullists and the Marxist socialists. His campaign slogan called for the advent of “an advanced liberal society” with the US as an implicit model.

To this day, it has remained a mystery why such a gifted and promising politician completed his presidency in disfavor. Giscard was the only president of the 5^th Republic who failed at a reelection effort. He was left deeply hurt and attempted another candidacy -- in vain.

Several reasons help explain his semi-failure. First, he failed at his attempt to de-dramatize the style of the presidency. The French don’t want another ordinary citizen as president, but prefer an exceptional, dignified and slightly remote figure. What made things worse is that Giscard was badly cast for the role of the ordinary Frenchman he tried to play. He could hardly hide his privileged background, his aristocratic physical features, elegance and speaking style. Many considered him arrogant. As Ann Richards famously said of George Bush senior, “[h]e was born with a silver spoon in his mouth.” De Gaulle once said of him that he was unable to transcend his class.

Giscard also failed in his main political challenge: delivering reforms despite his Gaullist partners dominating his small centrist party in the governing coalition. He was not bold enough to dissolve parliament after his election. The Gaullists resented his obsession with “change” and his seemingly greater concern for breaking with Gaullism than fighting the opposition left. He alienated his Gaullist prime minister Jacques Chirac who turned into a determined rival. Chirac helped elect Mitterrand in 1981 by refusing to endorse Giscard.

During the last years of his presidency, as the economic situation deteriorated further, Giscard looked more detached and monarchical. He was weakened by several scandals, including the accusation that he had received diamonds as a gift from the brutal Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic.

François Mitterrand

François Mitterrand was born in 1916 in rural western France into a Catholic bourgeois family. His long political career started with his election as deputy in 1946 and included eleven appointments as minister during the 4^th Republic. To this day, he remains the leading figure of the left during the 5^th Republic. His winding ideological itinerary encompassed Vichy, the resistance, the center-left and the Marxist left. Mitterrand exhibited many contrasts and contradictions and cultivated ambiguity and mystery. His inclination was to complicate rather than simplify.

For a non-ideological center-left politician from the 4^th Republic, Mitterrand adjusted brilliantly to the radically different political environment of the 5^th Republic. Along the way, he showed remarkable vision, opportunism and persistence. The vehicle for his presidential ambitions was the Socialist Party that he rebuilt in the 1970s by steering it towards a more doctrinaire Marxist line and an alliance with the communists. After two defeats in the run-off of the presidential elections, in 1965 against de Gaulle and 1974 against Giscard d’Estaing, he was finally elected in 1981 as the first socialist president of the 5^th Republic. Although being a life-long opponent of de Gaulle and the 1958 constitution, he said, “The constitution was not made for me but it suits me well.” This was so true that he ended up being the only president to complete two full seven-year terms.

His capacity to rebound and his opportunism were underscored in 1983 when he was forced to abandon his failed dogmatic socialist economic policies and opted for a strategy of deeper European integration. In 1986, he was the first president of the 5^th Republic to lose the legislative elections but preferred to govern with a political opponent as prime minister rather than resigning.

In the presidential election of 1988, he displayed his full range of political skill to outmaneuver his rival, prime minister Jacques Chirac. He was able to engineer a working relationship with opposition member Prime Minister Edouard Balladur between 1993 and 1995. His presidency drifted as his illness worsened and, while his cancer was kept a state secret, he was incapacited most days. He was also mired by political and financial scandals, including the revelation that he had kept close relations with former figures of the Vichy government.

His personality, leadership style, political itinerary and policies made him the most controversial and divisive president since de Gaulle. Both aroused intense admiration and loyalty as well as fierce opposition and hatred. However, there is a wide consensus in France that he was the most influential president since de Gaulle. Even his political opponents admired his exceptional political skills and his performance as France’s figurehead overseas. Mitterrand died in January 1996, a few months after finishing his second term.

Jacques Chirac

Born in 1932, Jacques Chirac was raised in an upper middle-class family with roots in rural central France. He developed a taste for the military as a soldier in Algeria before studying at the elite Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). He became an aide to Pompidou who noticed his energy, calling him “the bulldozer,” and appointed him to several cabinet posts. His tenacity and personal comfort with farmers made him a popular agriculture minister and he subsequently continued to champion farmers’ interests and relyed on the farmers’ political support.

Shortly after he became prime minister, he fell out with Giscard because of conflicting strategies and fierce competition between the Gaullists and the Giscardian wing of the majority. A bold, defiant and energetic Chirac resigned in a dramatic way, founded a new Gaullist party to serve his presidential ambitions and became the mayor of Paris to prevent the victory of a Giscard ally. He showed as much persistence as Mitterrand in his long journey to the presidency: only after being prime minister twice, mayor of Paris for eighteen years, and president for nineteen years of the neo-Gaullist party he founded, did Chirac become president in 1995 on his third attempt.

The 1997 dissolution of the Assembly that led to a cohabitation with Lionel Jospin illustrates Chirac’s occasional erratic judgment and willingness to listen to his closest advisers, in this case his chief of staff Dominique de Villepin and prime minister Alain Juppé. Since his reelection in 2002 with 82% of the vote against far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and his camp’s parliamentary victory, Chirac has reasserted his authority as well as his assertive leadership style, as evidenced during the Iraqi crisis.

Backgrounds, education and careers of French presidents

As a prelude to assessing the five French presidents according to Greenstein’s six dimensions of leadership, we can now draw broad comparisons between the family backgrounds, education and careers of French and American presidents. Of course, we should keep in mind the different sizes and timeframes of the two samples.

Of the five French presidents we reviewed, only Georges Pompidou comes from a modest background. This was also the case for Truman, Nixon, Reagan and Clinton. The parents of these American presidents were small businessmen whereas Pompidou’s parents were primary school teachers. Reagan and Clinton managed to overcome challenging family environments.

At the other end of the financial spectrum, Giscard is the only one whose family’s wealth can be remotely compared to that of FDR, Kennedy and the Bushes. Giscard’s family wealth derived mostly from government jobs as opposed to business success as in the case of the three American presidential families. The Roosevelt, Kennedy and Bush families were also involved in politics. This was true of Giscard’s and Mitterrand’s although at a more modest level. What seems most distinctive and interesting is that four out of five French presidents came from an upper-middle class background. By contrast, six out of twelve US presidents came from either very modest or very wealthy backgrounds.

With respect to education, all French presidents achieved the highest level of academic success in the very selective French system. This was not the case for Truman, who didn’t go to college, or for Ronald Reagan. De Gaulle and Eisenhower were trained as military officers. Carter earned a degree in nuclear physics. George W. Bush has an MBA. Five American presidents went to law school, as did Mitterand, but Clinton, a Rhodes scholar, arguably achieved the most academically, on a rough par with Pompidou, Giscard and Chirac.

Their career paths also show differences. Three out of five French presidents (excluding de Gaulle) had been higher civil servants. Among American presidents, only FDR and Bush senior held similar kinds of jobs as political appointees. De Gaulle, like Eisenhower, pursued a military career. Mitterrand was the only lawyer and Pompidou the only president who had a stint in the private sector as a banker. By contrast, most American presidents were in law, business and a wide variety of occupations: Truman was a farmer, Carter ran a peanut farm, Reagan was an actor and corporate spokesman, both Bushes worked in the oil business

With regard to political itineraries, all American presidents had previously held an elected office, whether in Congress or as governors. De Gaulle and Pompidou had not held elected office prior to becoming president. Carter, Reagan, Clinton and Bush junior had no previous careers in Washington. Actually, most American presidents were not nationally known before becoming president and only Nixon, Reagan and Bush senior had made unsuccessful runs for the presidency before being elected. This was also the case for Mitterrand and Chirac. But all French presidents had long and prominent political careers before their elections. Pompidou and Chirac had been prime minister and all except de Gaulle and Pompidou had been cabinet ministers. Six American presidents had been Vice-Presidents but none a cabinet minister. Only FDR, Eisenhower and Bush senior held sub-cabinet posts in the federal bureaucracy. The biggest difference, however, might be that all French presidents except Pompidou had led a major political party, a key leadership function in French politics and a stepping stone for the presidency. George Bush senior had been the chairman of the Republican National Committee but the job is not as visible, powerful or instrumental for the presidency as leading a major party in a large European country.

In sum, the paths to the French and US presidency are quite different, although they require some of the same leadership qualities. French presidents tend to come from upper-middle class, cultivated families whereas American presidents often come from more diverse backgrounds, including very modest or very wealthy ones, and occasionally from political dynasties. For French presidents, academic success in the handful of elite schools feeding the higher civil service is a key asset, almost a requirement. Although several American presidents have had law degrees from elites universities, outstanding academic achievement is not as widely shared or as crucial. However, the fact that Truman didn’t have a college education might only have reflected his times and is not an indication for the future. Finally, the path to the French presidency involves a long national political career at the top echelon. The path to the American presidency usually includes previous electoral success in the US Congress or as governor.

Knowing the personal and professional itineraries of French and American presidents, we can now assess qualities and shortcomings of the five French presidents according to the six leadership criteria Greenstein used for American presidents, and draw comparisons between leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

Public communication:

Not surprisingly, Greenstein gives the prize for proficiency in public communication to FDR, Kennedy, Reagan and Clinton at his best. The performances of Truman, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Bush senior were the least convincing in his eyes. In France, de Gaulle, Mitterrand and Giscard would come out on top, in that order.

Like Eisenhower, de Gaulle drew huge legitimacy and authority from his war hero status. His exceptional oratory only added to his larger than life epics and charisma. His speeches were classic exercises in high rhetoric and political leadership. He learned them by heart. Some of them carried crucial political messages and were historically defining, for example in Algiers in 1958 (“I understand you!”), Pnom Penh in 1966 against the Vietnam War, Quebec in 1967 (“Long life to a free Quebec!”). His radio message at the height of the May 1968 crisis helped turn the situation around in his favor. His press conferences were theatrical events where de Gaulle indulged in high drama and rhetoric: they remain references. His TV appearances, especially his interviews, were more stilted. His choice of words recalled Roosevelt, his intensity, Nixon.

Pompidou tried to play on his strengths, which were in many ways opposite to de Gaulle’s. He came across more as a father figure than an heroic one, more as an ordinary citizen in whom people would recognize themselves than as a modern monarch. Pompidou was physically round and temperamentally calm, reassuring, supple, private, simple and a model of balance; all qualities that helped him perform in times of crises and played well in public. He was no great orator but performed well at press conferences. His style was not unlike that of Eisenhower or Ford. He inspired the same confidence as FDR but lacked his authority.

Giscard was the first French president to fully master television as a medium. Giscard’s personal style was in stark contrast with his predecessors’: he was young, telegenic, relaxed, modern and technocratic. He was often compared with John Kennedy for his privileged background, his elegance, charm, brightness and dilettantism, but was colder, more austere and less romantic than Kennedy. Avoiding high rhetoric, he was didactic and pedagogical, often using charts and maps to persuade with facts, like Bush senior. He was as obsessed with the power of images, especially his own, as Reagan was. He broke with tradition by displaying his Kennedy-like picture perfect family on campaign posters. To modernize the traditionally stilted style of the presidency, he walked down the Champs-Elysée for his inauguration, a model Jimmy Carter followed two years later. He was pictured chatting with garbage collectors, shaking hands with prison inmates, playing the low-class accordion and he invited himself to dinner with ordinary families. These gestures led to the criticism of a “symbolic presidency.”

A lawyer, Mitterrand was a gifted orator who knew how to exploit the intricacies, ambiguities and esthetics of the French language. His style was more literary than that of any other French or American presidents. His television interviews had the whole political and journalistic establishment guessing the hidden meaning of his words. In many respects, he rivaled FDR in his mastery of political speech. However, like Clinton, he could fall into the trappings of improvisation and digression. Both also shared a talent for expressing empathy for ordinary people.

Jacques Chirac is not known for his oratory style. Like Nixon, he never felt at ease on TV, despite intensive training. His motion is stiff and awkward and he can be verbose. However, Chirac has no match as a campaigner. He exudes the same warmth in personal contacts as Clinton or George W. Bush, a Johnson-like charisma in small groups, and the same energy to electrify large crowds as Clinton.

Organizational capacity:

Greenstein defines the president’s organizational capacity as “his ability to rally his colleagues and structure their activities effectively.” He puts Eisenhower in a class of his own, especially for establishing the chief of staff and the National Security Advisor in the White House, but also acknowledges the qualities of Truman, Kennedy, Ford and Bush senior. The weakest presidents on that score have been FDR, Reagan, Carter and Clinton. In France, de Gaulle and Giscard d’Estaing have shown the greatest organizational capacity.

De Gaulle not only conceived and enacted a whole new constitution but as the first president of the 5^th Republic, he reorganized the Elysée from the ground up. He established the Secretariat General of the Presidency, the Staff of the President, the Military staff, and the Africa staff under Jacques Foccart. He demanded complete loyalty from his aides and easily obtained it out of admiration and devotion. He trusted former resistance fighters and technocrats more than parliamentarians and party leaders. He could be brisk with his ministers but gave them clear direction.

Pompidou didn’t have de Gaulle’s natural authority and charisma. Even though his staff liked him, he did not control it as well as de Gaulle. His staff included a lesser proportion of professional civil servants than that of other presidents. It was also more divided as a result of his strained relations with Jacques Chaban-Delmas, his first prime minister. His two conservative “eminences grises,” Pierre Juillet and Marie-France Garaud, accumulated a great deal of influence and tried to undermine Chaban. They were the president’s men, like Nixon’s Haldeman and Ehrlichman and Reagan’s Ed Meese, James Baker and Michael Deaver. The Elysée under Pompidou didn’t quite reach the level of divisions displayed by the entourages of Nixon and Reagan. Pompidou’s illness further eroded his authority, which benefited his chiefs of staff Michel Jobert and Edouard Balladur.

In a typical Kennedyesque fashion, Giscard surrounded himself with the best and the brightest, such as Jean Serisé. Under the cerebral and disciplined Giscard, the Elysée ran a tight and efficient operation, along the organizational chart of the Kennedy White House. Giscard replaced loyal Gaullists with his own people throughout the bureaucracy. He was a team-builder, like Truman, Kennedy and the two Bushes.

Mitterrand faced an unprecedented challenge because he was not himself from the civil service and was the first socialist president. That made him suspicious of the higher civil service, which he considered too conservative. He was able to appoint loyal supporters to key positions and was surrounded by socialist activists and intellectuals like Jacques Attali. However, he quickly realized that he could not challenge the all-powerful higher civil service and decided instead to co-opt it.

Mitterrand preferred written rather than oral communication with his staff and avoided meetings. Like Roosevelt, he planted the seeds of divisions among his staff by seeking advice from different sources. He blurred the lines of responsibility. His heterogeneous staff, where personal friends mixed with professional technocrats, reflected Mitterrand’s own lack of discipline: for example, his notorious passion for bookstores prevailed over punctuality at meetings. Such lack of discipline also characterized the Clinton White House. One of Mitterrand’s best friends and advisors committed suicide in his Elysée palace office.

In spite of his natural political instincts, Chirac doesn’t always trust his own judgment and needs constant advice and reassurance. He likes to rely on trusted advisors but also consults widely. During his first term, he let his chief of staff Dominique de Villepin wield unusual influence and, after his reelection, appointed him minister of foreign affairs. Chirac might not be the most analytical of French presidents but cannot be compared with FDR or Lyndon Johnson. According to Greenstein, LBJ lacked a “mechanism for assessing policy options.”

As a general rule, French presidents have been helped by the existence of a professional higher civil service from which they recruit their advisors. Coming themselves from the higher civil service, presidents benefit from sharing the same homogeneous culture as their advisors. By contrast, American presidents have to rely on a mix of loyal aides often unfamiliar with Washington and Washington insiders who are often strangers to them.

Political skill:

Greenstein assessed the skill of American presidents as political operators. He has high praise for FDR, especially during his first 100 days, as well LBJ and Reagan. In France, de Gaulle and Mitterrand were outstanding political operators.

De Gaulle had exceptional political skill. His favorite bedside book was Machiavelli’s “The Prince.” Like Eisenhower, he emphasized the ecumenical aspect of politics and the imperative of political unity, and placed himself above partisan divisions. He used his hero status, the myth of the resistance and the inclusion of communists in his post-war government to build his own legitimacy. He deftly negotiated his return to politics in 1958 and was able to steer Algeria towards independence without provoking a civil war. The gradual steps he took to prepare the public for that eventuality were reminiscent of Roosevelt’s efforts to prepare reluctant Americans for WWII.

De Gaulle’s abrupt style incurred costs, however. This was visible in his dealings with the US and Britain as well as in domestic politics. For example, during the press conference that followed the inclusion of the pro-European Christian Democrats into the first Pompidou government, he chose to lambaste European integration. The new centrist ministers resigned immediately. No wonder that by the time of the referendum that led to his resignation in 1969, he had lost all political allies and was left solely with his core loyal supporters.

The May 1968 crisis underscored both his drift and his ability to turn a dire situation to his advantage. At the height of the crisis, he disappeared for a whole day to seek reassurance from the commander of French forces in Germany. He didn’t tell Pompidou, who resented it. In contrast with his traditional self-assurance, he hesitated between replacing the prime minister, calling a referendum and dissolving the parliament. However, thanks to a mixture of surprise and firmness, he managed to turn the situation around with a radio address announcing the dissolution of parliament. In response, the pro-Gaullist forces flocked to the streets and later sent an enhanced majority to parliament. De Gaulle’s authority was permanently weakened, however, and his loss of sure-footedness was further underscored by his suicidal 1969 referendum.

Pompidou showed great political skill at co-opting his political rivals and broadening his coalition while at the same time institutionalizing the Gaullist party. He split the socialist opposition by organizing a referendum on Britain’s entry into the Common Market. His pragmatism allowed him to “cut Gordian knots,” a quality shared with Eisenhower and Johnson, according to Greenstein.

However, Pompidou also shared some of the shortcomings Greenstein attributes to Truman, such as an excessive concern for “getting along to go along,” being too reactive and “devoid of policy perspective.” His lack of authority was underscored by his inability to control his prime minister Jacques Chaban-Delams who overshadowed him and pursued policies at odds with his philosophy.

Giscard showed impressive political skills to reach the presidency. However, once elected, he failed to build the majority force at the center of French politics that he had envisioned and needed for his policies. He alienated Chirac and other Gaullists by seemingly fighting them more than he fought the left. He even reached out to center-left politicians with anti-Gaullist credentials. His focus on “change” didn’t correspond to the expectations of his conservative electorate. He failed to either convert the Gaullists to his style and policies or build his own party as a credible rival force to the Gaullist party, a solution that would have required dissolution. Such undermining of the Gaullists without allying with a new force only benefited the left.

Mitterrand’s nickname as the “Florentine” was testimony to his exceptional political skill. Mitterrand was always ready to use opportunistic means to achieve his ends. He was at his best in partisan maneuvering. He successfully grew the socialist party by cannibalizing the communists that he never trusted. He edged out his main socialist rivals, Alain Savary and Michel Rocard. He fuelled Le Pen’s rise to divide and weaken the Gaullists and the communists while holding the left together.

Mitterrand’s opportunism was underscored again before the 1986 legislative elections, when he tinkered with the electoral system to limit his losses and increase the representation of Le Pen’s National Front. He severely defeated Chirac in the 1988 presidential election by portraying him as his subordinate Prime Minister. He always managed to maintain core supporters on the left despite his many turnarounds on policy. He displayed what Greenstein calls a “readiness to change policies in response to political exigencies,” something all politicians have to do at some point, from Bush senior with tax increases to Clinton with healthcare reform. Over his long career, Mitterrand showed an ability to bounce back, like Nixon and Clinton, the “comeback kid.”

Chirac is more a raw political animal than a “Florentine.” He can display exceptional talents in electoral campaigns, thanks to his energy and empathy with voters. After he became a deputy in central France, he turned the entire region, traditionally under communist influence, into a stronghold for his party. He was bold enough to resign as Giscard’s Prime Minister, launch his neo-Gaullist party in 1976 and conquer the Paris city hall. He pulled off surprise electoral victories in 1978, 1995 and even 2002. However, his political instinct failed him in 1997 when his decision to dissolve parliament backfired. More recently, his opposition to the war in Iraq was not exempt from tactical and strategic miscalculations.

Vision:

Greenstein defines vision essentially as it applies to public policy. He acknowledges Nixon’s clear long-term goals, Eisenhower’s capacity for policy analysis and Reagan’s focus on a few verities. According to Greenstein (2000), Truman, LBJ and Carter all lacked vision. In the French field, de Gaulle is in a category of his own.

De Gaulle had “une certaine idée de la France” according to his own words. He knew where he wanted to take France and how. He was a restless and long-term thinker, like Nixon. Before WWII, he offered his own vision of new military doctrines, which was subsequently vindicated by the war. In the debacle of June 1940, he envisioned that the war could be won and called for continued fighting. On June 16, 1946, his Bayeux speech laid out his constitutional ideas, which inspired the 1958 constitution. He foresaw the necessity of reconciliation with Germany and made it happen. He had a clear vision of a “Europe des patries,” of Britain’s role in Europe, of France’s independence from the superpowers and of the rise of the third world. He strived to give France a nuclear force and homegrown high-tech industries. But he failed to anticipate and understand social trends as well as the potential of the United States.

Pompidou’s instinctive conservative views of society were no substitute for his lack of vision. However, he saw the need for France to become a strong industrial power. He supported Britain’s entry into the Common Market, in part to counterbalance the rise of Germany. Like Bush senior, Pompidou was more a reactive than a forceful leader and more pragmatic than visionary. His own career owed more to chance than a preconceived plan and ambition.

The opposite was true of Giscard d’Estaing, who had plotted his long-term career goals with great care. He had a clear vision of the kind of society he wanted for France: an advanced liberal society devoid of ideological and class divisions. However, his vision of an electoral majority in the political center failed. He pursued his vision of a united Europe with his friend German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with a mixture of idealism and pragmatism.

Mitterrand approached problems in partisan and tactical terms more than through the prism of policy. Despite his sometimes ideological rhetoric, he was largely indifferent to policy content, which was also the case for FDR and Johnson, according to Greenstein (2000). For example, he felt strongly about abolishing the death penalty, supporting the installation of Pershing II missiles in Europe and promoting European integration (after he converted to it) with Helmut Kohl. By contrast, promising the nationalization of industry was only instrumental in cementing his leftist coalition.

Vision is not Chirac’s forte. Like FDR or Johnson, he is an intuitive rather than a conceptual or analytical politician. He is not guided by long-term thinking or by a clear ideological inspiration. He has vacillated from conservatism to center-left, depending on the issues and the stage of his career. He was a neo-Gaullist in 1974-76, espoused a French version of British labor before turning into a free marketeer in 1986-88, was euro-skeptical before rallying the pro-European mainstream, campaigned on the center-left in 1995 and the center-right in 2002. However, he always held an uncompromising line against alliances with the far right.

Cognitive style:

Greenstein(2000) defines cognitive style as the ability “with which the president processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes his way.”

De Gaulle had an encyclopedic historical culture that he used to think about the long term. His strategic intelligence was not unlike Nixon’s. He shared with FDR an unusual ability to memorize, was widely read, and was recognized as a talented writer. Like Nixon, he was very intense and concentrated, never leaving his mind idle. He was analytical but mostly capable of sweeping syntheses. He could “cut through the core of problems” as Greenstein said of Eisenhower.

Pompidou also was very cultivated and, like Kennedy, was a quick study. He exhibited the kind of instinctive conservatism, common sense, open mind and thoughtfulness that Greenstein spotted in Gerald Ford. He too was able to “cut through the core of problems” and have a “net judgment about complex issues” like Eisenhower

Giscard’s intellectual brilliance can best be compared with that of Clinton, Kennedy and Bush senior, although the latter was not as articulate. His aptitude for policy analysis matched Eisenhower’s and contrasted with FDR’s or LBJ’s intuitive approaches and neglect for policy content.

Mitterrand’s culture was mostly literary and historical. He had little taste or knowledge for economics but proved a quick study under his tutor Jacques Attali. He also caught up quickly with foreign policy.

Chirac might not possess the natural intellectual gift of his predecessors, but he has always been a hard worker with a more solid grasp of the intricacies of policy than Mitterrand, for example. He shows barely more taste or ability for abstraction and ideologies than FDR.

Emotional intelligence:

Greenstein (2000) defined emotional intelligence as “the president’s ability to manage his emotions and turn them to constructive purposes rather than being dominated by them and allowing them to diminish his leadership.” Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Ford, Reagan and the Bushes showed the greatest amount of emotional intelligence, according to Greenstein. Johnson and Nixon were dominated by their negative emotions. Carter and Clinton also showed deficits in emotional intelligence. Among French presidents, Pompidou and Giscard probably lead the field.

De Gaulle cannot be considered a model of emotional balance. De Gaulle had a difficult temperament, a brisk way to deal with others and could be arrogant. He demanded loyalty and didn’t tolerate dissent easily. His was admired for his vision, his intellect and his leadership qualities but often criticized for his imperious style. He was proud and resented the way Roosevelt and Churchill had treated him during WWII. He also resented Pompidou’s independence and success during the May 1968 crisis. At the height of the May 1968 crisis, his self-assurance gave way to doubt and he turned to a friend for a psychological boost. However, he overcame war memories to reconcile France with Germany. He could also show real physical courage. For example, when his car was shot at in 1962, he refused to duck. As he stepped out and saw the car pierced by bullets, he told his chauffeur matter-of-factly, ”this time, they didn’t miss by much.”

Pompidou was emotionally stable and balanced. He was an epicurean and a dilettante who enjoyed art and literature, but also a hard worker with a rock solid temperament. He always managed to find time for his hobby of modern art and for friends outside politics. His was generally not an intense personality, even though he could occasionally show irritation and have temper tantrums. Most of the time, he was judicious, measured and self-disciplined like Truman and inspired confidence like FDR and Bush senior.

Giscard also showed great emotional control, but he came across as cold and passionless. He was evenly tempered, sometimes detached and aloof, like Kennedy. He is reported to have had two major temper tantrums, one after de Gaulle dismissed him as finance minister and once with the director of Le Monde newspaper who had revealed that he accepted diamonds as a gift from Emperor Bokassa (Conte, 1985). But Giscard didn’t like conflicts. Rather, he enjoyed dominating a situation as well as people. He could be revengeful, but when it came to making decisions, Giscard was analytical and unemotional, the way Eisenhower and Kennedy were. During his presidency, Giscard was comfortable with himself, like Pompidou and Reagan. However, it took him time to psychologically recover from the blow of his reelection defeat in 1981, which he considered unfair and raised personal doubts in him. His attempt to return to the highest level of politics after his defeat is testimony to his frustration as well as his pride and determination.

Like Giscard or Nixon, Mitterrand had an irrepressible psychological need to succeed and showed great persistence in reaching his goals. A complex personality, he remained as inscrutable as FDR could be. Like Nixon, he was suspicious of others. He never abandoned his inclination for polemics and manipulation. Even more than Giscard, he had a killer instinct in politics, something of which Pompidou and Chirac were incapable. In 1988, he had to control his intense dislike of socialist rival Michel Rocard and appointed him prime minister. After three patient years, he sacked him in the most contemptuous and humiliating of fashions. Mitterrand was often tense and agitated before becoming president, but after achieving his lifetime goal, he showed remarkable comfort and serenity in the job. He was said to lack gravitas as an opposition leader, but he grew into an instant statesman in the presidency. He achieved beyond expectations where Giscard failed to fulfill his promise.

Jacques Chirac has often been accused of being an “agité,” meaning somewhat restless, impulsive and unpredictable. These tendencies are believed to be compounded by the presence around Chirac of Dominique de Villepin, who shares the same kind of temperament. Another accusation is that Chirac is easily influenced by his close advisors. Pierre Juillet and Marie-France Garaud were suspected to have inspired a famous euro-skeptic statement in the 1970s and Alain Juppé and Dominique de Villepin advised in favor of the dissolution in 1997. Chirac needs reassurance from his family, friends and advisors about his judgments. He is more sentimental than his predecessors and lacks the “killer instinct” of a Giscard or a Mitterrand. This partly explains why he refused to fire his very unpopular Prime Minister Alain Juppé to try to save his majority after the 1997 dissolution. Juppé has been his protégé, whom he treats almost like a son. More generally, Chirac is known to care about others and to be capable of spontaneous signs of affection.

Presidential leadership styles matter as much in the French as in the American political system. While Greenstein (2000) described the American presidency, his different dimensions of leadership have comparative value and application in other societies.

The five presidents of the 5^th Republic have been exceptionally talented politicians. While they certainly did not overcome all the challenges they confronted, their long and arduous journey to the top gives the French electorate plenty of time and opportunity to assess their leadership qualities and shortcomings. Leading politicians are probably as prepared for the job as can be. However, they always reveal unsuspected aspects of their personalities and abilities once in office. This was especially true of Giscard and Mitterrand.

By contrast, the selection of American presidents leaves more to chance. This is because of a more open field of potential candidates -- many without national reputations --, the primary system, the American electorate’s taste for novelty, and the fact that no previous job can remotely test the leadership qualities that a president will need. The American president might not be as prepared for the job as his French counterpart, but he might better correspond to the mood and challenges of the country.

Compared with the modern American presidency, the French presidency as an institution seems more in flux. This is true of leadership style, which is likely to lose its traditional regal character in the future: the example set by de Gaulle has become less compelling, representations of authority are changing and the mythology of the State is faltering. In that respect, Chirac seems to be a transitional figure, in part because of his own temperament.

Institutional reforms, especially the shortening of the term to five years and the increasing powers of the parliament, the Constitutional Council and the institutions of the European Union, are likely to weaken the French presidency in the future. The difficult experience of cohabitation, with the president and prime minister of different parties, has fostered a constitutional debate that pits the proponents of a purely presidential system against those of a parliamentary system. In the first hypothesis, the post of prime minister would be eliminated; in the second, the president would be little more than a symbolic head of State.

Many of the challenges involving the leadership of French presidents have concerned their relationship with their prime ministers, even when there was no cohabitation. De Gaulle’s legitimacy and authority forestalled any challenge by a prime minister. However, he lost his trust in Pompidou in 1968. The clearest examples of tensions at the top of the executive branch were Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas, Giscard and Chirac, Mitterrand and Rocard, and these were not even cohabitations. Chirac didn’t wait to be dismissed and resigned voluntarily. Relationships are more likely to deteriorate if the prime minister entertains presidential ambitions.

Another factor that had an impact on the ability of the president to exercise leadership has been health. Pompidou and Mitterrand were incapacitated for years and chose not to resign. This probably could not have happened in the United States. Curiously, for a country with a taste for abstraction, none of the French presidents has given much importance to ideology. Even Mitterrand was fundamentally an opportunist, adjusting to circumstances and challenges as they arose. None was a conviction politician, like Reagan or Thatcher. De Gaulle had strong convictions but they were not related to ideology and he always considered circumstances first.

The French and American presidencies are among the best illustrations of the exercise of democratic leadership. Even though the cultures and institutional settings are different, the challenges are quite similar. In both cases, the personalities and leadership abilities of presidents vary enormously yet they are what matters most.

REFERENCES

(4) In Arthur Conte, op. cit., p. 253-5.